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Irrigation systems as common-pool
resources
Examples from Northern Italy
Giangiacomo Bravo and Beatrice Marelli
1 Common-pool  resources  (CPRs)  are  natural  or  man-made  resources  shared  among
different users, a condition that produces a competition for their utilization leading often
(although  not  necessarily)  to  their  degradation  or  even  to  their  destruction.  A  vast
number of valuable natural resources falls in this category and shows today “chronic”
problems of overuse. Examples are the world forests, fisheries, water basins, biodiversity
and even the atmosphere. Nevertheless, in contrast with previous theoretical predictions
including Hardin (1968) influential work on the “tragedy of the commons”, a vast number
of  empirical  researches,  and especially  Ostrom (1990)  seminal  work,  have shown the
possibility of a successful endogenous management of CPRs and explained theoretically
how this achievement is possible. 
2 This paper shortly discusses the “theory of the commons” as developed in the last 20
years by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues (e.g Ostrom, 1990, 2005; Ostrom et al., 1994,
2002) and illustrates it by mean of case studies regarding a number of irrigation systems
in Northern Italy (Lombardy and Vallée d’Aoste). Our main goal is to present the role that
different social mechanisms play in influencing the outcomes of the institutional schemes
for the commons management. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces
the theoretical background underlying CPR research; section 3 presents the empirical
research; section 4 discusses our findings and draws the conclusions. 
 
Theoretical background 
3 Formally, the expression common-pool resource refers to a class of goods defined by two
characteristics:  a  difficult  exclusion  of  potential  beneficiaries  and  a  high  degree  of
subtractability (i.e.  rivalry of consumption) (Ostrom et al.,  1994,  6–8).  Thus,  the CPRs
share  characters  with  both  the  private  and  the  public  goods,  namely  a  high
subtractability with the former ones and a low possibility of exclusion with the latter
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ones (Figure 1). This makes the management of CPRs especially complex: as in the private
good case, the subtraction of resource units from the commons (e.g. timber from a forest,
water from a basin, etc.) done by one user reduces the total quantity of units available for
the  other  users;  as  in  the  public  good case,  it  is  difficult  to  prevent  any user  from
continue to subtract units from an endangered resource (e.g. the ocean fisheries). This led
Hardin (1968) to depict the commons problem by means of a model akin to a Public-good
game, i.e. a n players version of the well known Prisoner’s dilemma. What is especially
important  is  that,  being the CPR problem a Public-good game,  there are no rational
incentives for any user to limit his/her consumption and, hence, the possibility to avoid
the resource degradation or destruction is extremely low. 
 
Figure 1. A general classification of goods
Ostrom et al., 1994, 7.
4 Hardin’s model applies to a vast number of situations, especially in the case of open-
access resources, and it represents a valid explanation of the reason beneath the overuse
of common resources done by rational individuals, even when this leads to a significant
harm in the long term. Hardin argued consequently for the public management of natural
resources. However, subsequent studies showed that, while adequate in some cases, this
solution is not always applicable, mainly because of management cost and of information
asymmetries. Similarly, the “classic” alternative of dividing and privatizing the resource
may help in some cases, but also be inapplicable or suffer of significant shortcomings in
other situations (see Ostrom, 1990, 8–13). Moreover, one of the basic findings of Ostrom’s
work is that many communities across the world actually succeed in solving the Hardin’s
dilemma  and  sustainably  manage  their  common  resources  by  building  small  scale
institutions,  well  adapted  to  the  local  conditions.  This  does  not  imply  that  the
endogenous management represents the solution for CPR problems. The main insight of
Ostrom’s  work  is  indeed  that  there  is  no  “only  way”  to  solve  commons  dilemmas.
Endogenous institutions can work well  in many situations,  but in case of failure it  is
essential to look for different solutions — e.g. centralized management, private rights, co-
management or a combination of different regimes — in order to avoid Hardin’s tragedy
(Marshall,  2005;  Ostrom,  1990,  2005;  Ostrom  et  al.,  1994).  All  those  schemes  have,
however,  one  point  in  common:  the  presence  of  an  institution  that  defines  clear
exploitation rights and creates the right incentives in order to avoid overuse. In other
words,  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  is  the  tragedy  of  open-access  resources,  not
necessarily the one for well managed CPRs. 
5 Subsequent works expanded Ostrom’s insights. Being impossible to explore the details of
the overwhelming vast literature on the commons, we will focus here on three important
developments: (I) the study of institutional dynamics and the interplay between
institutions and shared values; (II) the linking of CPR literature with ecological analysis;
(III) the analysis of resource management on wider scales, including the global one. 
6 I) The study of institutional dynamics investigates how institutional change is affected by
a number of factors including collaborative environmental management, i.e. based on the
Irrigation systems as common-pool resources
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 96-3 | 2008
2
attributes of the community called to solve collective action situations (e.g. Connors and
Dovers 2004; Marshall, 2005; Young, 2002). Since our paper basically adopt this approach,
will be discuss it in details later. 
7 II) CPR management literature has recently developed in the direction of an increasing
relationship with ecological studies.  This happened mainly through to the concept of
social-ecological system, an expression that emphasizes the linkages existing between
humans  and the  natural  systems  where  they  live.  Social-ecological  system literature
resulted in a wide number of theoretical an empirical works that studied a vast variety of
management practice cases from the point of view of their effects on ecosystem dynamics
and their capacity to learn from and to adapt to the feedback coming from the natural
environment.  Particular  attention  is  devoted  to  the  application  of  concepts  as
adaptability, resilience and robustness, first defined by the ecological science and pivotal
in explaining the evolution of complex systems (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Berkes et al.
2003; Gunderson and Holling, 2001). This field of inquiry currently represents one of the
most interesting new fields in the study of human-environment relationship. 
8 III)  Most of  the theoretical  work on large scale resources started only in the middle
Nineties  as  direct  extension  of  small-scale  CPR  research,  an  approach  that  led  to
emphasize the  common  aspects  of  the  different  levels  of  analysis  (e.g.  Buck,  1998;
Keohane and Levy, 1994). While this approach led to some immediate significant results,
it probably under-recognized the important differences linked with the scale increase
(especially  when  considering  the  global  commons)  in  terms  of heterogeneity  of  the
stakeholders, governance capabilities, and constitutional-choice institutional rules (e.g.
Paavola, 2008). 
9 Especially significant for CPR research is the fact that, in the last 15 years, most studies
were  conducted  under  a  unified  scientific  scheme:  the  Institutional  Analysis  and
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom et al., 1994, Chap. 2). The IAD framework is an
important research tool that highlights the basic elements to consider in a CPR study,
along with the relations among them (Fig. 2). The framework core is a conceptual unit,
the action arena, that includes actors interacting in a social space called action situation.
The characters  of  the actors  and of  the action situation define the arena,  while  the
interactions among individuals inside the arena produce the outcomes of the institutional
arrangement. Three classes of external factors affect the structure and the functioning of
action arenas: the states of physical world where actions are undertaken; the rules in use
by  participants  to  order  their  interactions;  the  structure  of  the  community  where
participants act. 
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Figure 2. The IAD framework
Ostrom et al., 1994, 37.
10 The irrigation systems represent a nice example of CPRs that were widely studied using
the IAD framework (e.g. Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1992; Tang, 1992; Uphoff, 1986). An irrigation
system is actually composed by two different common resources: the channel(s) and the
water.  Both resources cause (different)  collective action problems to their users.  The
channels pose mainly a provision problem since they need an adequate maintenance
whose  cost  are  shared  by  the  users.  The  water  use  triggers  instead  appropriation
problems, mainly linked to the division of water among the users and to the techniques
employed in order to monitor the respect of the water rights. Despite the difficult task of
managing  two CPRs  at  the  same time,  many  communities  across  the  world  actually
achieved this result. In most cases, this was done by building credible institutions, well
adapted to local physical and social conditions and able to create the right incentives in
order  to  push  the  users  to  respect  the  allocation  rights  and  to  contribute  to  the
maintenance of the common infrastructure (Ostrom, 1992; Tang, 1992). Without entering
the details, it is worth noting that the functioning of the CPR governing institutions are
indeed not only dependent from the physical attributes of the resource — e.g. the total
amount of water available, the construction material of the channels, etc. — but also from
the social characters of the community of users, i.e. the shared values and wordviews and
the existing network of social relations (Auer, 2006). The next section will explore the
interplay  among  those  different  elements  by  presenting  different  case  studies  of
irrigation  systems  located  in  Northern  Italy.  First,  a  comparative  research  on  nine
irrigation systems of the Vallée d’Aoste will delineate the relationship existing between
the characters of the community of users, the rules employed in order to manage the
resource and the outcomes in terms of sustainable water use. Then, a study of a single
irrigation system located in the province of Brescia (Lombardy) will deepen the analysis
of the interplay between values, trust and institutional performance. 
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Case studies 
The Vallée d’Aoste cases 
11 Notwithstanding the relative water abundance of the northern part of Italy, the Vallée
d’Aoste has an insufficient rainfall regime, with an average of 100 mm per year less than
the surrounding area.  Furthermore,  the rainfalls  are mainly concentrated during the
Spring and the Autumn, with a very dry summer. Other meteorological and geological
characteristics  of  the  territory,  like  the  dry  winds  and  the  strong  insolation  of  the
mountain  southern  sides,  contribute  to  the  relative  aridity  of  the  fields  that  need
intensive artificial irrigation in order to enhance their productivity. Lacking of natural
abundant rainfall, the inhabitants of the region have developed since the Middle Age a
widespread system of channels capting the water from the glaciers or from other sources
and  distributing  it  in  the  fields.  Notwithstanding  the  economic  and  technological
developments, most of the systems are still governed by users’ associations (consorzi).
The  associations  manage  and  maintain  the  centuries-old  channels  and  often  make
substantial improvements regarding the transportation and distribution techniques. 
12 The research, conducted a few years ago using the IAD framework as underlying scheme,
covered nine irrigation systems located in different areas of the region. Its results will be
here only shortly presented since the reader interested in a deeper discussion of the cases
can find further data in Bravo (2002). The nine associations presented major differences
in  terms  of  both  the  factors  affecting  the  action  arena  and  the  outcomes  of  the
interaction process. Regarding the physical attributes of the resource, the associations
differed  in  terms  of  dimensions,  water  availability  at  the  source  and  channel
characteristics  (pipelines  vs.  open-air  channels).  The  associations  differed  also  with
respect  to  both  the  rules  in  use  for  managing  water  withdrawals  and  channel
maintenance and to  the  monitoring arrangements.  Finally,  the  association presented
marked  differences  in  community  characters.  With  the  expression  “community
characters” we mainly refer to the interplay of two elements: the relationships (especially
mutual help relations) existing between users, and the presence of shared values, shared
knowledge and shared meanings regarding the different aspects of  everyday life and
work. 
13 The  external  context  played  also  a  significant  role  in  influencing  the  association
performances.  In  the  areas  where  the  importance  of  agricultural  practices  strongly
declined due to the rise of tourism as main economic activity, most of the association
members  have  a  main  job  outside  agriculture  and  give  little  weight  to  irrigation
problems. On the other hand, in areas enjoying lower tourism development, agriculture
and  especially  animal  husbandry  maintain  a  significant  economic  significance.
Nevertheless,  those  areas  often  suffer  from  out-migration  and  from  a  consequent
increase of the average age of the population. Despite the significant weight that the
associations maintain in those areas, they often experience a reduction in membership
and, consequently, an increasing difficulty in paying the channel maintenance costs. 
14 The  main  result  of  the  research  is  that,  besides  the  obvious  fact  that  larger  water
availability at the source helps in reaching an adequate level of irrigation of the plots, the
community represents a major factor that influences the outcomes of interaction in the
different action arenas and, consequently, the overall performance of the associations.
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Stronger communities have higher probabilities to solve the collective action problems
linked with water allocation and channel maintenance. This leads to better functioning
channels with lower water dispersion, to a greater respect of allocation rules and of water
rights, and to a consequent reduction of monitoring costs. On the other hand, having a
strong community represents a double-edge sword when the necessity of institutional
innovation arises,  e.g.  because of  changes  of  some resource attributes  and/or in the
external socio-economic con-test. A strong community can indeed help in overcoming
the collective action problems linked with the institutional change, a fact that actually
happened in  some of  the  most  successful  among of  the  studied  cases.  Nevertheless,
excessively  closed  communities,  with  fundamentally  backward  looking  values  and
worldviews, tend instead to respond negatively to any innovation hypothesis. In this case,
the strength of  the  community  represents  a  factor  that  goes  against  the  association
interest.  A  similar  situation  was  actually  recorded  in,  at  least,  one  of  the  analyzed
associations. 
 
The Farfenga case 
15 Farfenga is the name of a small-scale, self-governed irrigation association located in the
Brescia province. Brescia is the most extended province of Lombardy, an Italian region
that  encompasses  the  Retican  Alps.  Although  the  relative  abundance  of  the  rainfall
regime  of  this  zone  (an  average  of  1050  mm  per year),  assurance  about  constant
availability of water is of primary importance for local farmers. At present, the Farfenga
association includes about 40 households who grow cereals for the food market and/or
for the livestock feeding needs. The majority of these farmers are over 50 years old, since
younger members are departing the community in large numbers, so the social reality as
a whole is aging. Most of the members are males who hold the land property or who rent
it. 
16 The research found no substantial differences among the Farfenga community members
with  respect  to  the  main  worldviews  that  frames  social  daily-life,  according  with  a
common culture that comes from the rural tradition of Northern Italy. This implies the
respect of an implicit moral code, related to work relationships and mutual respect of a
hierarchy in the community, that privileges breadwinners as mouth of instances for the
whole household. Ancient farming tradition is extremely important also in influencing
irrigation practices, that in turn affect power relationships that transcend the irrigation
association itself, e.g. by reaching the local political level. 
17 The  decision-making  process  of  the  association  presents  no  differences  between the
members cultivating their own land and the tenants. Every three years, all the regular
members  elect  a  formal  board  of  representatives,  which  is  responsible  for  the
management of the whole commons. The main goal for the association is the provision of
water  for  all  the  crop  needs,  along  with  the  maintaining  and  the  improvement  of
transportation and distribution facilities. The association draws its water from natural
spring fountains that, at least in the past, were usually adequate to satisfy the irrigation
needs. 
18 Due to the overuse of the groundwater sources and to the end of the traditional crop
rotation practices in favor of corn monoculture, the farmers have recently experienced a
significant reduction of water availability. Similarly to the Vallée d’Aoste cases, a number
of changes in the external context played a significant role in producing this outcome.
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The association was created at the beginning of the twentieth century, when crops were
combined and planted in rotation in order to maximize both soil  fertility and yields.
Farmers traditionally paid consistent attention to the water channels, that were cleaned
monthly, and to the water patterns that were constantly monitored to make sure that
excess water flowed into underground cisterns for future use. However, a shift occurred
in the group’s vision of their commons when, about two decades ago, the European Union
started to subsidize corn. Following the resulting economic incentives, the association
ended  rotation  practices  and  turned  to  monoculture.  Whereas  natural  springs  and
streams  had  previously  been  sufficient  for  the  irrigation  needs,  this  new  intensive
farming led to a severe scarcity of water for all farmers. Moreover, the scarcity has been
exacerbated  by  the  incapacity  of  the  association  members  to  modify  the  existing
institutional schemes (and especially the water allocation rules) in order to adapt to the
new situation. 
19 In  this  context,  we  conducted  a  research  in  order  to  analyze  how  the  community
attributes  are  involved  in  the  process  of  institutional  construction  and  institutional
change  for  sustainable  CPR  management.  According  to  Ostrom  (2005),  the  main
community attributes affecting the action arenas are the values shared among users, the
level of common understanding that potential participants share (or do not share) about
the  structure  of  particular  types  of  action  arenas,  and  the  extent  of  preference
homogeneity among the community members. Our focus lays in the exploration of the
relationship among reputation, trust and reciprocity, considered here individual values,
and institutions, defined as the rules-in-use governing the resource. The research has
been conducted using the IAD Framework (Fig. 2) as underlying scheme and opting for a
qualitative  method  of  data  collection,  which  comprised  in-depth  interviews  and  the
submission of semantic differential to a large share of the community members, including
the association board members. We found that there is a strong relationship between the
level  of  consciousness  of  the  risk  of  overexploitation,  the  sensitivity  for  resource
preservation, and the willingness to restrict water access during the dryer season. More
generally, community members appear to be able to cope with scarcity only when they
recognized the need to limit self-interest in the name of common goals. 
20 A fundamental variable in the analysis is trust, both at the individual and at the group
level. Especially important is the level of trust that the association members experiment
toward the institution, i.e. independently from personal trust shared among its individual
members.  Trust  develops  only  when the institution is  preserved from the individual
attempts to exploit it for private benefit, e.g. by manipulating the rules that govern the
water rotation system and the irrigation time. In addition, we found that a widespread
level of positive reputation is needed in order to sustain the trust network, especially in
difficult times or in times of change (e.g. the shift from crop rotation to monoculture). By
conducting a cluster analysis on our data, we found that three subgroups exist inside the
community. They are mainly linked with different level of education and, more generally,
with different capability to adopt long-term view of the purpose of the irrigation practice.
The main result of the research is hence that, in order to achieve a sustainability of the
institutional performance over time, the existence of a willingness to reciprocate among
members and the subgroups is essential. However, reciprocity establishes mainly thanks
to  reputation,  values  and  practices  that  spread  mutual  trustworthiness  among  all
community members. 
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Discussion 
21 The main goal of the paper, besides presenting the CPR theory and its application to
irrigation  systems,  is  to  show  the  role  that  different  social  mechanisms  play  in
influencing  institutional  performance  for  commons  management.  In  our  empirical
analysis, we found a positive relationship between the achievement of sustainability of
the institutional arrangement and the presence of a widespread body of shared values
among community’s members, which allows the groups to overcome the management
limitations  due  to  the  underlying commons dilemma.  Consistently  with our  study,  a
growing body of literature (e.g. Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2005; Ostrom and Ahn, 2008) has
recently shown that a successful CPR management implies an institutional construction
able to take adequately into account, among the community attributes, the values shared
among the resource users. Those values are indeed the vehicle of collective learning and
the foundations of social order inside the community of users, as well as instruments of
consciousness regarding the necessary institutional adaptation and flexibility. 
22 Crafting institutions for governing irrigation systems is challenging and requires skills in
understanding how rules produce incentives and outcomes when combined with specific
physical, economic and cultural environments. According to Ostrom (1990) and Uphoff
(1986),  there is  no  “one  best  way”  to  organize  irrigation  activities,  because  rules
governing the supply and use of any particular physical system must be devised, tried and
modified over time. It is hence necessary to invest considerable time and resources in
learning more about how various institutional  rules affect  the users’  behavior.  When
institutions  are  well  crafted,  opportunism  is  substantially  reduced.  The  temptations
involved in free riding, rent seeking and corruption can never be totally purged, but
institutions can be devised in order to hold those factors under control (Ostrom, 1992). In
order to decrease opportunistic behavior, coordination activities such as monitoring and
sanctioning  may  have  to  be  increased.  Lack  of  monitoring  and  sanctioning,  unfair
monitoring  cost  share  and  expensive  arrangements  for  conflict  resolution  can  all
undermine the complex system of mutual expectations and commitments (Ostrom and
Walker, 2003). 
23 The costs of monitoring and sanctioning activities necessary to eradicate opportunistic
behaviors are often not affordable for local communities of users, because controlling
opportunistic behaviors involves both a reduction of “free-riding temptations” and a high
likelihood of being discovered when transgressing a rule. In this process, common values
and shared norms can make  the  difference,  thanks  to  the  establishment  of  internal
commitment and punishment that push the actors to respect the rules in use and hence
reduce the monitoring and sanctioning costs.  Irrigation systems should hence devise
workable procedures for the monitoring of the behavior of water suppliers and users, for
the  sanctioning  of  non-conforming  behavior  and for  conflict-resolution.  Where
substantial temptation exists to engage in opportunistic behavior, no set of rules will be
self-enforcing (V. Ostrom, 1980).  However, our research found that the existence of a
common set of values is extremely useful in increasing the institutional performance and
in controlling free-ride behaviors. It is relatively easy to include this new variable in the
IAD  Framework  thanks  to  the  concept  of  social  capital.  Social  capital  is  a  concept
encompassing those cultural, social and institutional aspects of a given community that
jointly affect its capacity to deal with collective-action problems. Alternatively, it can be
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viewed as an attribute of individuals that enhances their ability to solve collective action
problems (Ostrom and Ahn, 2008). Social capital is usually the product of a past history of
tight relationships and little social capital exists when large numbers of heterogeneous
individuals act in an unknown situation. 
24 A final point which is important to recognize is that genuine trustworthiness, i.e. the
individual preferences consistent with conditional cooperation, is an independent and
nonreducible  reason  for  explaining  how  communities  achieve  collective  action
compliance.  Among  the  variable  involved,  the  one  that  creates  the  strongest  links
between social capital and collective action is trust. Trust is enhanced when individuals
are trustworthy, are networked with one another and act within institutions that reward
honest behaviors (Marshall, 2005). In accordance with Ostrom (1998), our findings suggest
that in addition to learning instrumental heuristics, individuals learn how to adopt and
use norms and rules from the group. Our results give also support Ostrom (1998, 1999)
idea of a core relationship existing among trust, reputation and reciprocity. We found
indeed that those factors are dependent from the community past experiences and from
the capacity of its members to recognize a major common interest in preserving the
resource. Once in place, those factors enhance in turn the capacity of a community to
govern its commons and, especially, to foster the neverending process of institutional
adaptation necessary for a long term sustainable management of natural resources (see
Berkes et al., 2003). 
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ABSTRACTS
Common-pool  resources  are natural  or  man-made resources  shared among different  users,  a
condition  that  produces  a  competition  for  their  utilization  leading  often  (although  not
necessarily) to their degradation or even to their destruction. This paper shortly discusses the
"theory of the commons", as developed in the last 20 years by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues,
and illustrates it by mean of case studies regarding a number of irrigation systems in Northern
Italy  (Lombardy  and Aosta  Valley).  We show that  that  different  social  mechanisms,  like  the
shared values e the social network existing inside the community of users, play a significant role
in influencing the outcomes of the institutional schemes for the commons management. 
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Les ressources communes sont des ressources naturelles ou artificielles partagées par différents
utilisateurs ; l’exploitation de ces ressources crée une rivalité, souvent (mais pas nécessairement)
à l’origine de leur dégradation,  voire  de leur destruction.  Cet  article  présente brièvement la
théorie des ressources communes développée ces vingt dernières années par Elinor Ostrom et ses
collègues,  et l’illustre par plusieurs études de cas de systèmes d’irrigation du nord de l’Italie
(Lombardie  et  Vallée  d’Aoste).  Il  démontre  que  différents  mécanismes  sociaux,  tels  que  les
valeurs partagées et le réseau social existant au sein de la communauté d’utilisateurs, influent
sensiblement sur l’efficacité des systèmes institutionnels de gestion des ressources communes. 
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